What a seal cannot see
The list of things outside rule set one, so that nobody reads more into eight answers than is there.
A seal is a floor. This page is the ceiling: everything the eight checks do not look at, and the review may or may not catch.
Anything not on the list
Rule set one asks eight questions about the shape of the code. It does not ask about reentrancy in arbitrary external calls, integer arithmetic outside supply, oracle manipulation, front-running, flash-loan surfaces, signature replay, access control on functions that are not about supply, balances, tax, transfers or upgrades. A contract can pass eight of eight and be exploitable in a way none of them cover.
State
The seal is on bytecode. Bytecode is the same for every deployment. So the seal cannot see:
- who the owner is of this deployment, or whether ownership was renounced;
- constructor arguments: the treasury address, the initial fee, the router;
- liquidity: whether there is a pool, how deep, whether the LP tokens are locked;
- supply distribution: whether one wallet holds ninety percent;
- the current value of any variable: the tax today, the switch today (check 07 tests the transfer today; check 05 tests whether it can change).
Two deployments of the same sealed code, one honest and one not, wear the same seal.
Intent
The seal cannot see what the deployer means to do. A token with an owner-only setFeeRecipient passes the checks; the review will say the owner can redirect fees; whether they will is not a question code answers.
The review's blind spots
The review is one model's reading, once, of the project's own files. It does not read dependencies, so a malicious fork of a library in lib/ is outside its view (it is inside the checks' view, since the checks read the compiled whole). It can miss things. It can be wrong. It is signed so that being wrong has a cost, and labelled so that nobody mistakes it for the proof.
Check 07's shape
The fork simulation is a transfer, not a swap. A tax or a revert that only triggers on a pool interaction is not exercised.
The vote
Claims are decided by stakers. Stakers can be lazy or captured. The claimant's bond and the auditor's exclusion from its own vote are guards, not guarantees.
The size of the money
The stakes and the cover pool are what they are. An exploit larger than them is larger than them.
Name and symbol
name and symbol on a seal are what the submitter typed. They are not read from the token. A seal named "USDC" is a seal on whatever bytecode it names.
What to do with this page
Read the eight answers and their evidence. Read the review. Then look at the things this page lists, yourself, on the explorer: the owner, the liquidity, the holders. A seal makes that shorter; it does not make it unnecessary.